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THE TRADE ACT OF 1974: SOVIET-AMERICAN
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain destruction
and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of men.
It unites them by one of the strongest ties-the desire of supplying their mutual
wants. It disposes them to peace by establishing in every state an order of
citizens bound by their interest to be the guardians of public tranquility.
-Frederick William Robertson*
On January 3, 1975, President Gerald Ford, expressing reservations, signed
the Trade Act of 19741 into law.2 Those reservations were uttered with regard
to the danger that the Act would seriously harm, as Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger put it, "one particularly vexing aspect of America's trade strategy:
The normalization of commercial relations with the Soviet Union." 3 While the
Act does provide far-reaching presidential authority to negotiate reductions in
or to eliminate barriers to trade, thereby fostering economic development at
home and abroad, it is a serious setback to "detente" in the area of Soviet-
American commercial relations. This Note will describe the Trade Act, exam-
ine the history of Soviet-American commercial relations, and discuss the impli-
cations of the Act on the future of those relations.
II. THE TRADE ACT OF 1974
As presented by Congress, the purposes of the Act are: (1) to foster economic
growth and full employment at home and to strengthen economic relations with
other lands through open and nondiscriminatory world trade; (2) to lessen the
barriers to such trade, assuring equivalent competitive opportunities for United
States commerce; (3) to reform the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT); (4) to provide procedures for protection of American industry and
labor from injurious import competition and for assistance to them in the
adjustment to changes in international trade flow; (5) to open up market oppor-
tunities for United States commerce in nonmarket economies; and (6) to pro-
vide access to products of developing countries in the United States market.4
* THE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 146 (J. Bradley, L. Daniels, & T. Jones eds.
1969).
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (1975).
N.Y. Times, January 4, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
1 Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 453 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings].
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (1975).
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A. Title I-Negotiating and Other Authority
The latest round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations commenced in
Geneva in September 1973. 5 The talks have not been conducted seriously,
however, because the United States Government has not had the authority to
negotiate on substantive issues.8 Title I of the 1974 Trade Act provides the
President with that authority. Section 101 delegates the basic authority for the
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries, including the
modification of any existing duties when the President determines that such
duties are unduly burdensome to foreign trade. Limitations are placed on this
authority. There can be no decrease of any duty below 40 percent of the rate
which existed on January 3, 1975,1 except when that duty is not more than 5
percent ad valorem.' No increase of a duty is allowed to be greater than the
higher of: (1) 50 percent above the rate in column 2 of the Tariff Schedules of
the United States' as of January 3, 1975; or (2) the rate which is 20 percent
ad valorem above the rate existing on January 3, 1975.10 The President is given
further authority to reduce non-tariff barriers (and other distortions) to inter-
national trade by agreement with other countries, but only with the prior
consultation of and approval by Congress."
The overall negotiating objectives of the United States are to obtain a more
open and equitable market access and to decrease distortions of commerce.,2
Other objectives are: (1) to obtain, for the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors, competitive opportunities for exports from the United States to devel-
oped countries equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded in United
States markets to the importation of similar products;" (2) to promote the
economic growth of developing lands;" (3) to agree on procedures allowing
adjustments according to changes in competitive conditions in the domestic
markets of both lands;"s and (4) to assure American access at reasonable prices
to resources unavailable in the United States."
The Act requires that implementation of duty reductions over 10 percent
1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. I, at 276.
Id. pt. 2, at 462.
7 19 U.S.C. § 2111(b)(I) (1975).
Id. § 2111 (b)(2).
Tariff Schedules of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. III, 1973), amending 19 U.S.C.
§ 1202 (1970).
10 19 U.S.C. § 211l(c) (1975).
I Id. § 2112. Prior consultation and approval of Congress are not required with respect to the
modification of duties. Non-tariff barriers include quotas, import licensing, customs valuation
techniques, laws limiting government procurement to national sources, subsidies, border tax adjust-
ments, product standards, and the like. Gibson, The Trade Reform Act at Mid-passage: A Com-
mentary on H.R. 10710, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 565 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gibson].
1 19 U.S.C. § 2113 (1975).
Is Id. § 2114.
" Id. § 2116.
3 Id. § 2117.
" Id. § 2118.
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must take place in stages, rather than at once. The staging period may be as
long as 10 years. The reduction may not be more than 3 percent ad valorem,
or one-tenth of the total reduction, per year. 7
Section 121 provides that the President is to take the following steps toward
the revision of GATT: (1) to revise the decision-making procedures so as to
reflect more nearly economic interests;"8 (2) to have GATT apply to all import
restraints; (3) to extend GATT to cover a greater number of trade conditions
in order to obtain equitable trade practices; (4) to adopt international fair labor
standards; (5) to revise the articles with respect to treatment of border adjust-
ment for internal taxes; (6) to revise the balance-of-payments provision to
recognize import surcharges as the preferred means to handle balance-of-
payments deficits; (7) to improve the provisions governing access to food prod-
ucts, raw materials, manufactured and semimanufactured products; (8) to au-
thorize procedures with respect to member or nonmember countries who deny
such access, causing substantial injury to the international community; (9) to
establish procedures for regular consultations and adjudication with respect to
international trade; (10) to apply the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimi-
nation to all aspects of international trade; (11) to define forms of subsidy
which are consistent with open, nondiscriminatory trade; and (12) to establish
an international agreement on articles. 9 These provisions envision a dramatic
restructuring and expansion of GATT. The provisions are ironic in that section
121(c) requires congressional approval of any revisions, while the original
American accession to GATT was by executive agreement.
The President may, with the consultation and approval of Congress, impose
nondiscriminatory, broad and uniform import surcharges and/or quotas to
deal with large and persistent balance-of-payments deficits, and/or to prevent
a significant depreciation of the dollar." The quotas may not be in effect for
longer than 150 days, and the surcharges may not be greater than 15 percent
ad valorem."' Section 122 also provides for the temporary reduction of duties
(of not more than 5 percent ad valorem) and for the temporary increase in the
value or quantity of articles which may be imported in the event of large and
persistent United States balance-of-trade surpluses or in face of a significant
appreciation of the value of the dollar.2
Section 123 provides the President with the authority to enter into trade
agreements in order to grant new concessions as compensation to other coun-
tries if action is taken under section 203 to increase or impose duties or other
17 Id. § 2119.
" At present, GATT article XXV provides that decisions are to be made by a majority vote,
with each contracting party entitled to one vote. In this subsection Congress is attempting to obtain
for the United States greater decision-making power in accordance with its position of influence
and leadership in GATI. Gibson, supra note I1, at 569-70.
1' 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1975).
- Id. § 2132.
21 Id.
2 Id.
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restrictions. 3 If the President determines that a major industrial country has
not made concessions under trade agreements entered into under the Act which
provide substantially equivalent competitive opportunities for American com-
merce, he may recommend to Congress legislation providing for the termina-
tion or denial of any American concessions entered into under such agree-
ments .2 Section 127 holds that no reduction or elimination of any duty or other
restriction shall be made if the President determines that such action would
threaten to impair national security.2
The Act provides numerous procedural steps to assure that the President will
have sufficient information and advice to enter safely into trade agreements.
The President is to furnish the International Trade Commission (formerly the
Tariff Commission) with lists of articles to be considered for duty modifica-
tion. 2 The Commission is to advise the President as to the economic repercus-
sions of such an action.27 He is also to receive advice from any appropriate
Executive Department (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, etc.).2 1 Public hear-
ings are to be held.2 These steps are prerequisites to any American offer to
decrease import restrictions of any sort.30 The Act creates an Advisory
Committee for Trade Negotiations."' An extensive procedure is established
whereby the Committee will advise the President and Congress on all policy,
technical, economic and other factors to be kept under consideration before
and after all trade negotiations and agreements. 32 Representation on the Com-
mittee will include members of government, labor, industry, agriculture, small
business, service industry, retailers, consumer interests, and the general pub-
lic.3
An Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is estab-
lished.31 The Special Representative will be the chief United States representa-
tive to trade negotiations, will be responsible for administration of trade agree-
ment programs, will advise the President and Congress on all trade matters,
and will be chairman of the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations.
The Act establishes strict congressional procedures with regard to bills imple-
menting trade agreements on non-tariff barriers, resolutions approving com-
I d. § 2133.
24 Id. § 2136. A "major industrial country" includes Canada, Japan, the European Economic
Community or any member thereof, or any other land so designated by the President. Id.
I d. § 2137.
26 Id. § 2151(a).
Id. § 2151(b).
I' d. § 2152.
I d. § 2153.
- id. § 2154.
3, Id. § 2155(b)(1).
32 Id. § 2155.
SId. § 2155(b)(1).
14 Id. § 2171.
35 Id.
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mercial agreements with Communist countries,36 and resolutions disapproving
presidential actions or recommendations under the various sections of the
Act.37 The sections prohibit amendments to implementing bills or ap-
proval/disapproval resolutions, and limit debate to 20 hours. A clear congres-
sional policy to come to a speedy, definitive decision on trade matters (once
those matters reach Congress) is seen here. Section 161 stipulates that five
members each from the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Committee on Finance shall be designated as official advisors to United States
delegations to international conferences, meetings and negotiating sessions on
trade agreements. 38
B. Title H-Relief from Injury Caused by Import Competition
It was extremely important (lest protectionist forces were to prevail) that
relief be provided for any economic disruptions which could result from the free
trade policy of the Act. Title II sets forth a comprehensive program of such
economic relief.
Whenever the International Trade Commission finds, upon thorough investi-
gation, that an increase of imports is a substantial cause of serious economic
injury (i.e., idling of productive facilities, inability to operate at a reasonable
profit level, or significant unemployment) or threatens serious economic injury
(i.e., a decline in sales, production, wages, or employment), it is to advise the
President as to what form of import relief should be provided.39 Within 60 days
the President is to determine what action, if any, is required and so report to
the Congress.4" This action shall consist of: (1) an increase in duty on any article
causing, or threatening to cause, serious injury to an industry; (2) a tariff-rate
quota on an article; (3) quantitative restrictions; (4) the negotiation of market
agreements with foreign governments, restricting the export of such an article
into the United States; or (5) any combination thereof." If the President pro-
claims the implementation of no relief, or of a form of relief different from that
recommended by the International Trade Commission, the Congress may dis-
approve the President's actions and implement the International Trade Com-
mission's proposal." The President may not proclaim a duty increase greater
than 50 percent ad valorem,'3 nor may any quantitative restriction or market-
ing agreement permit the importation of a quantity or value less than the
quantity or value of such an article imported into the United States during the
most recent period which the President determines is representative of imports
of such article."
- Id. § 2191.
- Id. § 2192.
- d. § 2211I.
- Id. § 2251.
40 Id. § 2252.
" Id. § 2253.
11 Id. § 2253(c)(I).
,3 Id. § 2253(d)(1).
4 Id. § 2253(d)(2).
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The Act provides adjustment assistance for workers whose union's (or other
representative's) application for assistance has been approved. In order for one
to qualify for such assistance, the Secretary of Labor must have determined
that an increase of imports in competition with the articles produced by the
workers' firm has been a substantial cause of a significant decline of sales or
production, leading to the total or partial separation, or the threat thereof, of
a significant number or proportion of workers.'5 If a worker is eligible he may
receive remuneration of 70 percent of his average weekly wage (not in excess
of the average weekly manufacturing wage), reduced by 50 percent of the
amount of remuneration for services performed during such week, and reduced
by any unemployment insurance received." Such an allowance may be received
for up to 52 weeks.47 The Labor Department is required to make efforts to place
workers in other jobs." If placement is impossible without training, the Depart-
ment may approve such training for workers. 9 The worker may receive an
allowance during the training" for up to 26 weeks.5 ' Job search 2 and relocation
allowances" are available under certain conditions to help defray expenses in
obtaining a position beyond commuting distance if no positions are available
in the immediate area. Judicial review of determinations made by the Secretary
of Labor is provided.5 The Nixon Administration estimated that the cost of
the labor adjustment assistance program might reach $350 million.5
If the Secretary of Commerce determines that an increase in imports has
contributed importantly to a decrease in the sales or production of a firm,
which leads to the total or partial separation, or the threat thereof, of a signifi-
cant number or proportion of workers, then the firm so affected becomes
eligible for adjustment assistance protection .5 If a firm is eligible, the Secretary
of Commerce may grant assistance: (1) if the firm has no reasonable access to
private financing; and (2) if the firm's adjustment proposal (a) is reasonably
calculated to contribute materially to the economic adjustment of the firm, (b)
gives consideration to workers, and (c) shows that the firm will make reasona-
Is Id. § 2272.
46 Id. § 2292.
," Id. § 2293.
Is Id. § 2295.
4- Id. § 2296.
- Id. § 2292.
I d. § 2293.
5I Id. § 2297.
Ia d. § 2298. All payments to workers are drawn from an "Adjustment Assistance Trust Fund,"
which is to be made up of collected customs duties not otherwise appropriated. Id. § 2317.
Id. § 2322.
1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 249.
19 U.S.C. § 2341 (1975). The Act provides a rather broad definition of "firm," including an
individual proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, association, corporation (including a develop-
ment corporation), business trust, cooperative, trustee in bankruptcy, and receiver under decree of
a court. A predecessor or successor firm which is afliliated, substantially controlled, or beneficially
owned by the same persons is to be considered a single firm where necessary to prevent unjustifiable
benefits. Id. § 2351.
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ble efforts to utilize its own resources for economic development. 7 Two types
of assistance may be provided: (1) technical assistance to develop a proposal
for economic adjustment and/or assistance in implementation of such a pro-
posal; 51 or (2) financial assistance in the form of direct loans or loan guarantees
(a) for acquisition, construction, installation, modernization, development,
conversion, or expansion of land, plant, buildings, equipment, facilities, or
machinery, or (b) to supply working capital necessary to implement the adjust-
ment proposal. 9 The Act places strict limitations on the availability, manage-
ment, and repayment of such loans or guarantees. 0 There is an aggregate limit
of $3 million in guarantees and $1 million in loans to any one firm.6" The Nixon
Administration estimated that the cost of the adjustment assistance for firms
might reach $50 million.62
Whenever the Secretary of Commerce concludes that a rise in imports has
contributed importantly to the decline in sales or production of firms leading
to the total or partial separation, or threat thereof, of a significant number or
proportion of workers in a "trade impacted area" in which a community is
located, that community is eligible to apply for adjustment assistance for com-
munities.6 3 A Trade Impact Area Council for Adjustment Assistance is to be
established in the trade impacted area. The Council is to develop a plan for
economic rejuvenation and coordination of community action.64 Adjustment
assistance is to consist of: (1) all forms of assistance, other than loans, which
are provided under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of
1965;1s and (2) loan guarantees. 6 The guarantees are to be administered under
a detailed plan, and the United States share of loan guarantees on loans out-
standing may not at any time exceed $500 million. 7
17 Id. § 2342.
" Id. § 2343. If technical assistance is provided by private entities, the Secretary of Commerce
is authorized to share up to 75 percent of the cost. Id. § 2343(c).
5' Id. § 2344. The Act does not call for the institution of a "Trust Fund" with regard to financial
assistance for firms. However, all repayments of loans, interest receipts, etc., are to become
available for other financing and for expenses entailed under the program. Id. § 2347(c).
Id. §§ 2345-50. Priority is given to small firms (within the meaning of the Small Business Act)
in the making of loans or guarantees. Id. § 2345(d).
" Id. § 2345(h).
'= 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 249.
13 19 U.S.C. § 2371 (1975). The geographical boundaries of the "trade impacted areas" are to
be determined in consultation with the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 2371(e).
" Id. § 2372. The Council is to include representatives of certified communities, industry, labor,
and the general public. Id. § 2372(b)(2).
61 42 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq. (1970). The Act provides grants and technical assistance in the
development of public works and public service facilities.
19 U.S.C. § 2373 (1975).
I d. § 2373(g). Payments are to be made from a "Community Adjustment Assistance Fund."
The Fund is to receive $100 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and any necessary
sums in successive years, plus any collections, repayments of loans, or other receipts received under
the program. Id. § 2374. The General Accounting Office is to evaluate the effectiveness of these
adjustment assistance programs and report to Congress on them within 5 years. Id. § 2391.
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The Secretaries of Commerce and Labor are to establish a program to
monitor imports of articles into the country, which will reflect changes in
volume of such imports, related changes in domestic production and employ-
ment, etc. 8 Any firm relocating in a foreign land is to give 60 days notice to
all employees to be separated and to the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor.
The firm is expected, but not required, to apply for and use adjustment assis-
tance, offer other employment opportunities to separated workers, and to assist
in the relocation of such workers." The Act thus expresses a desire that firms
will assist in the easing of the economic pains of such a move, but provides for
no guarantee of such assistance. In toto, title II thus establishes an extremely
complex and time-consuming procedure to implement massive economic assis-
tance in times of distress engendered by freer trade.
C. Title Ill-Relief from Unfair Trade Practices
Title III gives the President a number of tools to help counterbalance foreign
activity which tends to give the imports of those lands an unfair competitive
advantage over similar American-made products. Section 301 of the Trade Act
provides that the President shall take certain steps when he determines that a
foreign land: (1) maintains unjustifiable tariffs or other trade restrictions which
impair commitments made to the United States or which discriminate against
United States commerce; (2) engages in discriminatory policies which unjusti-
fiably burden American commerce; (3) provides subsidies (or the practical
equivalent of subsidies) on its exports, which results in a substantial reduction
in sales of competitive American products; or (4) imposes unjustifiable re-
strictions on access to food, raw materials, manufactured and semimanu-
factured products which burden United States commerce.7" These steps are
aimed at the reasonable elimination of such restrictions, including the cessa-
tion of trade agreement benefits to that country and the imposition of in-
creased duties and other restrictions on the offending imports. 71 Such actions
are to be taken only if the remedies provided in the Antidumping Act of
192172 and section 303 of the Tariff Act of 19303 are inadequate to deter
the practices. Before taking action, the President must: (1) provide the
opportunity for the presentation of all views on the advisability of such a
course; (2) hold public hearings if requested; and (3) request the International
Trade Commission to advise him of the probable impact on the economy. 4 Any
presidential determination will take effect unless Congress adopts a concurrent
resolution of disapproval within 90 days of the President's report to Congress.75
68 Id. § 2393.
e' Id. § 2394.
Id. § 2411(a).
7' 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1975).
72 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1975), amending 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
73 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1975), amending 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
7, 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(e) (1975).
11 Id. § 2412.
[Vol. 5: 505
SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMERCE
Section 321 of the Trade Act amends the Antidumping Act of 1921,76 pro-
cedurally and substantively, in an effort to improve the administration of the
Antidumping Act and to ensure vigorous and timely relief to domestic produ-
cers adversely affected by dumped imports.77 If it is determined by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury that a domestic industry is being injured or is likely to be
injured or prevented from being established because imports are being sold at
less than fair market value, the Antidumping Act allows special duties to be
placed on such imports. A dumping duty is imposed on imports covered if the
purchase price or exporter's sales price is less or is likely to be less than the
foreign market value or, if that can not be determined, the constructive value.7"
The Trade Act provides for the following changes: (1) published determinations
containing statements of findings and conclusions (and their rationale) on all
material issues presented; (2) imposition of time limits for the Secretary of the
Treasury to determine whether dumping exists; (3) a requirement of private
hearings prior to the determination; (4) amendments to the definitions of "pur-
chase price" and "exporter's sales price"; and (5) amendments dealing with the
determination of foreign market value.7
Similarly, section 331 of the Trade Act amends the Tariff Act of 19300 in
order to grant more timely and comprehensive relief from injury caused by
bounties or grants paid by foreign governments to their exporters. Section 303
of the 1930 Tariff Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to impose a
"countervailing duty" when he determines that a bounty or grant has been paid
directly or indirectly on any dutiable imported product. The countervailing
duty is equal to the amount of bounty or grant and is collected in addition to
the normal customs duty." The Trade Act makes several changes in the 1930
Act: (1) it imposes limits on the time allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to
determine whether a bounty or grant is being paid or not; (2) it broadens the
scope of the statute to cover imports of duty-free articles if there is a determina-
tion of injury, but only if such determination is required by international obli-
gations;" and (3) it grants discretionary authority for the Secretary to remedy
the problem under other sections of the Trade Act. 3 Such determinations are
76 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1975).
11 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. I, at 309.
78 Id.
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-65 (1975), amending 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-65 (1970).
0 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1975).
sI Id.
82 Under article VI of GATT, countervailing duties may not be imposed unless the foreign
subsidies cause or threaten to cause material injury. However, this GATT requirement does not
apply to the Tariff Act of 1930 because of GATT's "grandfather clause." Thus, no determination
of material injury is necessary for dutiable articles. With regard to duty-free articles, the Trade
Act does not require a showing of material injury, but merely a showing of "injury." 19 U.S.C. §
1303(b)(l)(A) (1975), amending 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970). As a result, this section may not conform
with article VI of GATT. Gibson, supra note II, at 595-96.
19 U.S.C. § 1303(d) (1975), amending 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
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subject to the approval of Congress and successful attack by American produ-
cers, manufacturers or wholesalers."
Section 341 of the Trade Act amends section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193015
to provide a greater assurance of due process in the administration of patent
infringement claims involving foreign commerce. Section 337 of the 1930 Tariff
Act declares unlawful unfair methods and acts of competition in the importa-
tion of articles which destroy or substantially injure United States industry
or which restrain or monopolize commerce."s The 1930 Act authorizes exclu-
sion of such articles.87 Virtually all cases under the section have involved patent
infringement." The Trade Act makes the following revisions: (1) it provides
that the International Trade Commission, not the President, shall make the
determination whether unfair acts or methods of competition exist (but deter-
minations are subject to the President's approval); (2) it provides the right of
judicial review in the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals; (3)
it ensures the right of presentation of all legal and equitable defenses; (4) it
permits, at the Commission's discretion, the continued importation, under
bond, of articles under investigation for patent infringement; and (5) it exempts
contested articles imported by and for the use of the United States Government
from claims of patent infringement, but calls for compensation to the patentees
of such articles before the Court of Claims."9
D. Title IV-Trade Relations with Countries Not Currently Receiving
Nondiscriminatory Treatment
Title IV deals with trade relations with countries not currently receiving
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. It makes freedom of emigration a pre-
requisite to the granting of such nondiscriminatory status, 0 as well as providing
other regulations for East-West trade. Title IV will be discussed in detail later.
E. Title V-Generalized System of Preferences
Title V of the Trade Act marks the beginning of a United States policy to
stimulate the economic growth of developing lands by a grant of special trade
benefits.
The Trade Act provides that duty-free treatment may be provided for eligible
articles for a "beneficiary developing country."" Whether a land is to be so
designated depends on: (1) an expressed desire for such treatment by the coun-
try; (2) the level of economic development of the country; (3) whether other
developed lands are extending such treatment; and (4) the extent to which the
- 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1975), amending 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970).
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1975).
" Id. § 1337(a).
87 Id. § 1337(d).
" 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 314.
- 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1975), amending 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
30 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1975).
"Id. § 2461.
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country assures the United States it will provide equitable and reasonable
access to the markets and basic commodity resources of the country." The Act
puts a number of limitations as to which lands can be designated beneficiary
developing countries. It excludes the following: (1) certain developed lands,
such as Japan, South Africa, European Economic Community Member States,
etc.; (2) Communist countries not receiving nondiscriminatory treatment, or
Communist nonmembers of GATT and the International Monetary Fund, or
any land dominated or controlled by international communism; (3) members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or any similar
arrangement of lands which withhold supplies of vital commodity resources or
raise their prices unreasonably so as to cause serious disruption of the world
economy; (4) lands which offer preferential treatment to products of other
developed countries, but not the United States, to the significant detriment of
United States commerce; (5) countries which have effectively nationalized
United States controlled property without prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation, or negotiations thereto; (6) countries which do not cooperate with
the United States to prevent narcotic drugs from entering the United States
unlawfully; and (7) countries which do not recognize or enforce arbitral awards
in favor of the United States. 3 The latter three exceptions may be waived if
the President determines it would be in the national economic interest to do
so." The Act puts specific limitations on the articles which are eligible for duty-
free treatment, including articles whose cost of production is not less than a
specific percentage of their appraised value 5 for all articles and an absolute
prohibition of such treatment on certain articles.96 The Act gives the President
the authority to terminate duty-free treatment with respect to all articles" or
only certain articles" of the beneficiary developing country.
11 Id. § 2462(c). Such a determination is made by Executive order. The Congress must be
notified of an intent to do so and the reasons for that action. Id. § 2462(a)(1). But congressional
approval is not required.
.3 Id. § 2462(b).
I4 ld.
" Id. § 2463(b).
95 Textile articles, watches, import-sensitive electronic and street goods, some footwear items,
and some glass products may not be designated as eligible articles. Id. § 2463(c)(l).
9 Id. § 2464. The President may withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of duty-free treat-
ment if any of the conditions in 2462(b)(l)-(6) come into play. Id.
11 Id. § 2464(c). The President shall withdraw duty-free treatment from any article upon a
determination that either: (1) the country has exported to the United States during the calendar
year a quantity of the article having an appraised value in excess of an amount which bears the
same ratio to $25 million as the gross national product of the United States for the preceding
calendar year bears to the American gross national product for calendar year 1974, or (2) the
country has exported to the United States a quantity of any article greater than or equal to 50
percent of the appraised value of the total imports of the article into the United States during the
year. Id. §§ 2464(c)(l)(A)-(B). The latter condition shall not apply with respect to any article if a
like or directly competitive article was not produced in the United States on January 3, 1975. Id.
§ 2464(d). Both conditions may be waived and duty-free treatment continued with respect to an
article if the President determines that: (1) there has been a historical preferential trade relationship
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Thus, via title V the United States takes a limited first step toward the
assistance of the developing lands in their economic development through less
restricted trade.
F. Title VI-General Provisions
Title VI consists of a number of general provisions, including the wish of
Congress to establish a free trade area with Canada" and the limitation of $300
million in government backed loans, guarantees and insurance to the Soviet
Union'0 (to be discussed at length later).
The Trade Act of 1974 represents a rather comprehensive plan to regulate
foreign trade. The opportunity for increased and less restrictive trade is pre-
sented. A clear policy to lower trade barriers and to foster economic growth is
evident. Yet protectionist clauses abound in the Act. The Congress has endea-
vored to assure that if the American economy is injured by increased imports,
relief will be at hand through economic assistance to those aggrieved, or
through tightening the inflow of foreign goods. The Congress has made its
consultation and approval necessary in a very large number of decisions, con-
cerning foreign trade, to be made by the President. The Act ensures that the
President will have all possible information available to him through the estab-
lishment of the various commissions and boards. The Act tries to assure that
foreign governments will no longer be able to maintain restrictive trade barriers
against United States commerce when the United States is permitting a much
freer flow of trade from that land to America. A strong reaction to the recent
petroleum "crisis" is reflected in the Act. Measures aimed at ensuring that
countries will not restrict the flow of resources (either by unreasonably high
prices or failure to sell), which are vital to the industrialized world, are seen in
various places. Such measures are in contrast to the provisions in title V aimed
at increasing (through duty-free treatment) the economic growth of developing
countries who often are the holders of the same vital resources. (Query: What
would be of greater economic benefit to a developing nation, a multiple in-
crease in receipts from the sale of commodities, or duty-free treatment of a
number of articles exported to the United States?) Despite all of these
protectionist qualifications, the net result of the Trade Act as a whole should
be the stimulation of less restrictive world trade.
III. SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE, 1917-1971
Congressional authority to regulate foreign trade has been premised on the
between the two lands; (2) there is a treaty or trade agreement in force covering economic relations
between the two lands; and (3) the country does not discriminable against or impose unjustifiable
or unreasonable barriers to United States commerce. Id. §§ 2464(c)(l)(B)(i)-(iii).
" Id. § 2486.
I Id. § 2487.
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power granted by the commerce clause'0' "to regulate commerce with foreign
nations."'I0 2 Since the creation of the Soviet State in 1917, with economic and
social views in opposition to American views and with the ever present danger
of military conflict, the Congress has seen fit to legislate extensively with regard
to trade with Communist countries.
The 1921 Antidumping Act'I 3 and the countervailing duty requirements of
the 1930 Tariff Act' 4 are laws of broad application and apply to the Soviet
Union. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934'01 authorized conces-
sions to be granted to all lands, including the Soviet Union, in an effort to bring
the economy out of the depression.
The Johnson Debt Default Act of 19341'6 was enacted as a reaction to sub-
stantial defaults by European lands on bonds sold in America during World
War I and the 1920's.I17 The Act prohibits a number of financial transactions
by Americans with foreign governments which are in default on their obliga-
tions to the United States. Included among the prohibited transactions are
loans to and the purchase or sale of bonds, securities, or other obligations of
those foreign governments.' 0 The Act has been applied to the USSR because
of the failure of the Soviets to repay certain Czarist debts and certain World
War II lend-lease loans.' The term "loans" in the Johnson Act has been
construed to apply to commercial credits of 180 days or longer." ' However,
the apparent harshness of the Act is mitigated to a great extent because of a
number of factors. First, most sales of commodities do not entail financing in
excess of 6 months. " ' Secondly, Attorney General Opinions have held that
the Johnson Act does not apply to any of the following: (1) "foreign currency,
postal money orders, drafts, checks, and other ordinary aids to banking and
commercial transactions;""' (2) sales transactions by American exporters on
a deferred-payment basis;"' (3) lines of bank credit; (4) barter arrangements;
101 Bilder, East- West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor Union, State and Local Inter-
ferences with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 924 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bilder].
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
103 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1975); see text accompanying footnotes 76 through 79.
,0 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1975); see text accompanying footnotes 80 through 84.
IS Ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
' Ch. 112, 48 Stat. 574 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1970).
107 Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. I,
13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HoS'a].
'08 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 321.
'" Starr, A New Legal Framework for Trade Between the United States and the Soviet Union:
The 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 81 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Starr,
Framework].
"* S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN EAST
AND WEST 108 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PISAR].
1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. I, at 321.
11Op. ATT'Y GEN. 505, 512 (1934); see Starr, Trading with the U.S.S.R. and China, 28 Bus.
LAW. 1301, 1303-04 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Starr, Trading].
" 42 Op. Arr'Y GEN. No. 15, at 4 (1963).
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and (5) deferrals of payment pending development of earnings.", Thirdly, the
Johnson Act does not apply to the operation of foreign subsidiaries of Ameri-
can banks."' And fourthly, the Act exempts the following from the force of
the statute: (1) any United States government corporation; (2) any foreign
government which is a member of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank; and (3) any transaction participated in by the Export-Import
Bank (Eximbank)."8 Thus, although some types of financial transactions may
be clouded by the Johnson Act, it is really no longer a serious practical obstacle
to most East-West transactions." 7
In contrast to the gradual relaxation of trade barriers among western nations
since the conclusion of World War I1,118 American legislation vis-a-vis trade
with Communist nations has been quite stringent. Under the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951,11 Eastern European nations (including the Soviet
Union) were denied most-favored-nation tariff treatment. The result is that
imports from the USSR face a competitive disadvantage, because they are
subject to custom levies established under the Tariff Act of 1930120 as set forth
in column 2 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.' The rates are
materially higher than those which are applied to imports from the rest of the
world.'22
The 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, as amended, 2  (also
known as the "Battle Act") authorizes United States participation in
"COCOM," the "Coordinating Committee" of Western allies (including all
NATO lands except Iceland, as well as Japan) who have agreed to prohibit all
exports of strategic materials to Communist countries.'2 ' The embargoed items
include about 500 categories of arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic
materials and facilities, and other strategic goods. 25 Participation in COCOM
is voluntary. The designated items are at a minimum. The United States gov-
ernment maintains an embargo list significantly longer than the COCOM
"' 42 Op. ATT'y GEN. No. 27, at 5 (1967).
115 39 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 398, 401-02 (1939).
' Hoya, supra note 107, at 13. However, the Soviet Union is not a member of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and it should be noted that other limitations have been placed
on Eximbank credit to the USSR.
Il? Starr, Trading, supra note 112, at 1304-08.
I Since 1934, in fact, Western nations have made many bilateral trade agreements granting
each other trade "concessions," reducing import duties on products from the other country, on a
"most-favored-nation" basis. Since 1948 GATT, which now has 83 members, has held a series of
multilateral negotiating sessions, progressively reducing maximum limits on tariffs. The latest
round, as mentioned before, began in Geneva in 1973. Gibson, supra note II, at 556-58.
"' Ch. 141, § 25, 65 Stat. 73 (1951).
RN Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970).
121 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. III, 1973), amending 19 U.S.C. 1202 (1970).
' PISAR, supra note 110, at 98.
' 22 U.S.C. § 1611 et seq. (1970).
124 Starr, Trading, supra note 112, at 1302.
' Comment, What to Expect when Trading with the U.S.S.R.: The Problems ConJronting the
American Exporter, 2 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 19, 23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
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list. 2' The Battle Act further prohibits American military, economic, or finan-
cial assistance to any country which knowingly permits shipments of arms,
ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy materials, and other strategic
goods to Communist countries. Since 1951, Presidents have not used their
discretion to stop aid to offending countries, but they have used the Act as a
bargaining lever in negotiations with other governments.' r
For 20 years the basic authority of the executive branch to regulate the
export of commodities and technical data to Communist countries was the
Export Control Act of 1949. '28 This statute was superseded by passage of the
Export Administration Act of 1969'2 as amended by the Equal Export Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972.130 The acts require export licences for virtually every
export of goods or technical data to every country of the world except Canada.
Under the 1969 Act, the purposes are to: (1) protect national security; (2)
further American foreign policy and fulfill America's international responsibil-
ities; and (3) protect the domestic economy from shortages and from inflation
as a result of abnormal foreign demand."3 ' The new statute differs from the
1949 Act in that: (1) the statutory criterion in the 1949 Act, that the export of
commodities and technical data must not contribute to the "economic poten-
tial" of the recipient country, is eliminated; and (2) in considering an export
license application, the Commerce Department is required to make a finding
of the availability of comparable products from other foreign sources.3 2 The
Office of Export Control in the Bureau of Foreign Commerce administers the
program. While all exports to Communist bloc lands require licenses, the
regulations provide for different degrees of administrative control depending
on the destination and type of goods or technology involved. Less sensitive
exports are authorized under "general licenses" and do not require special
advance publication or approval. Exports of a more sensitive nature can be
shipped only pursuant to a "validated license," which requires individual ad-
vance clearance from the Office of Export Control.'3 Other agencies also
exercise specialized licensing jurisdiction. Thus, the Department of State regu-
lates exports of arms and related technical data; the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion controls sales of nuclear materials; the Treasury Department supervises
the sale of gold and narcotics; and the Department of Agriculture, the Mari-
time Administration, and the Federal Power Commission grant export licenses
' Hoya, supra note 107, at 8-9.
' PISAR, supra note 110, at 133.
12 Ch. 1I, 63 Stat. 7 (1949).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-13 (1970)).
,a Pub. L. No. 92-412, 86 Stat. 644 (1972) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-06 (Supp. II,
1972)).
,3, Hoya, supra note 107, at 7.
1 Nehemkis & Schollhammer, International Business Transactions with the Soviet Union
and Mainland China: Prospects and Hazards, 28 Bus. LAW. 17, 24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Nehemkis & Schollhammer].
"3 Bilder, supra note 101, at 845-46. General Export Regulations are located at 15 C.F.R. §§
368-99 (1974).
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in their respective spheres of responsibility.'34 Whether or not a validated
license is needed can be determined by: (1) the type of goods and ultimate
destination; (2) whether the article is on the "Commodity Control List" and
(3) the discretion, ultimately, of the licensing body.3 5
The strict American regulation of trade with the Soviet Union since World
War II has also accurately reflected the feeling of the American people. 36 As
Samuel Pisar expressed it in Coexistence and Commerce:
For more than two decades the United States has been locked in a struggle
with the Soviet Union, involving America's fundamental interests and requir-
ing a significant portion of its material resources and political energies. Many
United States citizens have died in armed conflicts linked in one way or
another with the clash of Washington's and Moscow's foreign policies. The
very survival of the United States has been solemnly pledged as security
against the threat of Soviet attack on certain other Western states. Even where
the military interests of the two blocs have not been counterpoised the struggle
has frequently been continued by other means-diplomatic, ideological and
economic.
Understandably enough, the grim scenario of East-West relations, which
began to unfold in the early forties and late fifties, affected the political psyche
of Americans at all levels . .. . 3
Thus, the fear of contributing to Soviet military power through any type of
economic assistance has flourished and is still very much alive today, despite
the fact that economic boycotts of strategic products never harmed the develop-
ment of Russian might, even when the economy of the USSR was much
smaller and the cost of maintaining its military establishment was relatively
much higher." s The Soviets will continue a high level of military development
regardless of any economic "aid" (trade) from the West.
In the 1960's various groups often united in drives to bring about boycotts
of firms which sold Communist imports. The groups picketed, advertised, and
distributed information in attempts to pressure business into foregoing the sale
of imports from the Eastern bloc. 39 Sometimes these tactics were successful.
For example, the Firestone Rubber Company decided not to sign a contract
for Rumanian rubber because of public pressure from the Young Americans
for Freedom." 0 Some labor unions refused to load wheat onto ships destined
"' PISAR, supra note 110, at 119; see Hoya, supra note 107, at 14-18, for descriptions of
agricultural, shipping, aid and investment programs with regard to Eastern Europe.
"a PISAR, supra note 110, at 121. For an examination of all of the factors going into the Office
of Export Control's decision see Pisar, at 118-31.
I3 See Bilder, supra note 101, for a very extensive account and analysis of this aspect of East-
West trade.
'3 PISAR, supra note 110, at 79.
I1 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 485.
"' Bilder, supra note 101, at 863-65.
" PISAR, supra note 110, at 84-85.
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for the USSR, "' while some municipalities enacted ordinances designed to
discourage the sale of Communist-produced goods by requiring licenses and
conspicuous signs to be placed in stores."'
Domestic public opinion also played a role in restraining the Government
of the United States from taking advantage of trade "olive branches" extended
by the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's the Soviet Union
approached the United States with plans of increasing Soviet-American trade.
In 1952 Stalin convened a special trade meeting in Moscow at which there was
much talk of billions of dollars of annual business between the two countries."'
In 1958 Nikita Krushchev proposed to President Eisenhower a trade agree-
ment, listing many goods which the Soviet Union wished to purchase or sell in
the United States. In 1964 Alexei Kosygin renewed the offer of such an agree-
ment."' The United States rejected both offers. The Trade Expansion Act of
1962'15 continued to prevent the extension of MFN status to the Communist
countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia and Poland.
A thawing of the American position began with regard to trade in the mid-
1960's. The Johnson Administration submitted the East-West Trade Relation
Act of 1966,'" which would have authorized the grant of MFN status to the
Soviet Union. However, the bill was never reported out of committee."47 In
1968 the Congress amended the Export-Import Bank Act' to restrain the bank
from financing transactions with Russia, but this amendment was repealed by
Congress in 1971.' 4 In 1970 and 1971, export licensing requirements for over
1,700 commodities were eased."'0 Such a relaxation reflects the more liberal
policy of the 1969 Export Administration Act. 5' Indeed, "the Congress has
made clear that national security controls over exports shall be administered
to facilitate, and not prevent, trade in nonstrategic goods and the Executive
Branch has shown that it can exercise considerable flexibility to relax controls
as relations with Communist countries improve.""'
Trade between the United States and the Soviet Union has been rather small
in terms of dollar amounts. From 1950 to 1959, United States exports to the
Soviet Union averaged less than $1 million per year. Soviet exports to the
United States during the same period averaged $21 million. In 1960 American
", Bilder, supra note 101, at 875-81.
1I2 Id. at 882.
"1 New York Times, June 18, 1972, § 4, at 3, col. 3.
"I Berman, The US-USSR Trade Agreement from a Soviet Perspective, 67 AM. J. INT'L L.
516, 519 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Berman].
", Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1967).
"' See 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 838, 843-44 (1966).
1,7 Bilder, supra note 101, at 857.
", 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1970),formerly ch. 341, 59 Stat. 526.
", 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 316.
' U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL-99TH QUARTERLY REPORT, IST QUARTER
1972, at 15 (1972).
't Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-13 (1970)).
12 Starr, Trading, supra note 112, at 1301.
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exports to Russia jumped to $39.6 million and generally climbed throughout
the decade to $57.7 million in 1968. With the passage of the 1969 Export
Administration Act, United States exports hit $105.5 million and reached $162
million in 1971. Soviet exports to the United States remained around the $20
million level until 1965 when they jumped to $42.6 million and reached $72.3
million in 1970.'1 When these totals are compared to total trade figures, they
appear rather insignificant. American exports to the Soviet Union represented
less than 0.2 percent of America's total exports in 1965, and less than 0.5
percent in 19 7 1.H Soviet exports to the United States represented 0.5 percent
of its total exports in 1965 and 0.6 percent in 1970.' ss In 1971, Canadian-
American trade totalled $23 billion and Japanese-American trade exceeded $11
billion,'" far higher than the Soviet-American total of $219 million in 1971.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1971
A. The Trade Agreement of 1972
The year 1972 was a historic turning point in Soviet-American commercial
relations. In May 1972 President Nixon and Secretary-General Brezhnev
agreed upon "Basic Principles of Relation Between the United States of Amer-
ica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."' 7 The statement emphasized
the two nations' desire to strengthen bilateral relations and to promote com-
mercial and economic ties. Out of the negotiations which followed the Moscow
summit came the Grains Agreement' on July 8, 1972; the Maritime
Agreement"' on October 14, 1972; and the Trade Agreement'60 and the Lend
Lease Agreement,' both on October 18, 1972. Article I of the Trade Agree-
151 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, Table, at 682.
'1 Id. Tables, at 664, 682.
"I U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SELECTED U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TRADE AND
ECONOMIC DATA, Table, at 6 (May 1974).
' N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1972, at 1, col. I.
'1 Agreement with the Soviet Union on Basic Principles of Relations, May 29, 1972, II INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 756 (1972).
lu Grains Agreement with the Soviet Union, July 8, 1972, [1972] 2 U.S.T. 1447, T.I.A.S. No.
7423. The notorious wheat sale involved the sale of $750 million worth of grain, on a credit base
of $500 million, to be repaid within three years of delivery dates.
I" Maritime Agreement with the Soviet Union, Nov. 22, 1972, [1972] 4 U.S.T. 3573, T.I.A.S.
No. 7513. The Maritime Agreement centered on: (I) opening channels of maritime commerce
between the two lands through the opening of major United States and Soviet commercial ports
to calls by certain United States flag and Soviet flag vessels; and (2) affording those vessels the
opportunity to participate equally and substantially in the carriage of all cargoes moving by sea
between the two nations.
10 Trade Agreement with the Soviet Union, Oct. 18, 1972, II INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1321 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Trade Agreement]. The Trade Agreement was to enter into force upon the
exchange of notices of acceptance, which has never taken place. See Starr, Framework. supra note
109, for a careful analysis and explanation of the Trade Agreement.
161 Lend Lease Agreement with the Soviet Union, Oct. 18, 1972, [1972] 3 U.S.T. 2910, T.I.A.S.
No. 7478. Other agreements include: Agreement with the Soviet Union on Scientific and Technical
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ment grants MFN status to each other country with regard to: (i) customs
duties and any other charges in connection with trade; (2) internal taxation,
sales, distribution, storage, and use; (3) charges on the international transfer
of payments; and (4) rules and formalities in connection with importation or
exportation. "' It should be noted that to grant MFN status is not, as many
believe, to grant a "privilege," but is to remove a discrimination.' 3 The other
party is merely treated, in trade matters, on an equal basis with the overwhelm-
ing majority of the world's countries."' General MFN treatment is based on
paragraph I of article I of GATT, which grants the same treatment to all other
contracting parties with regard to duties as is granted to the most favored
nation of the particular state.6 5 Article 2, paragraph 2 of the 1972 Trade
Agreement preserves any restrictions which the United States has levied on the
export of goods for national security reasons.' Article 3 assures the right to
take protective measures against market disruptions caused by imports from
the other nation.' Article 4 assures payment in freely convertible currency. "'
Article 5 authorizes the United States Government to establish a Commercial
Office in Moscow and the Soviet Government to establish a Trade Representa-
tion Office in Washington.' Article 6 ensures reciprocal legal status via the
waiver of sovereign immunity of corporations, foreign trade organizations, etc.,
in each country.7 0 Article 7 encourages the use of arbitration in the settlement
of disputes.'' The Agreement does not specify any quantitative amount of
trade to be attained, but article 2, paragraph 4 states that the USSR expects
to place substantial orders in the United States for machinery, plant and equip-
ment, agricultural products, industrial products, and consumer goods., The
Cooperation, May 24, 1972, [1972] 1 U.S.T. 857, T.I.A.S. No. 7343; Protocol Relating to the
Possibility of Establishing a Soviet-American Chamber of Commerce, June 22, 1973, [1973] 2
U.S.T. 1498, T.I.A.S. No. 7656; Protocol Relating to the Expansion and Improvement of Com-
mercial Facilities in Washington and Moscow, June 22, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1501, T.I.A.S. No.
7657; Protocol Relating to a Trade Representation of the Soviet Union in Washington and a
Commercial Office of the United States in Moscow, Oct. 3, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 7738; and the
Agreement with the Soviet Union on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation, June 29,
1974, T.1.A.S. No. 7910. There have also been agreements between major United States businesses
and the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. These agreements call for the
"exchange of specialists and information, joint research programs, purchases of equipment and
technology and licenses for production processes." Comment, supra note 125, at 33-34.
112 Trade Agreement, supra note 160, at 1322.
'1 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 455.
" Id. pt. I, at 243.
"5 GATT Secretariat, The Most-favored-nation Clause in GATT, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 791-
92 (1970).
'" Trade Agreement, supra note 160, at 1323-24.
"I Id. at 1224-25.
I Id. at 1325.
I, d. at 1325-26.
0 d. at 1326-27.
I" d. at 1327-28.
7Id. at 1324.
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two governments "envision that total bilateral trade in comparison with the
period 1969-1971 will at least triple over the three-year period"'" of the Agree-
ment. In light of such language, the grant of MFN status should certainly
stimulate an increase of Soviet imports from the United States.'74 Indeed, the
Agreement as a whole "embraces the view that trade in nonstrategic goods is
to be encouraged.""'
The Trade Agreement would have been impossible without the Lend Lease
Settlement, which settled at $722 million the amount owed by the Soviet Union
to the United States for assistance in World War 11.176 The amount is to be
paid by the year 2001, with the sum of $48 million being unconditional and the
balance contingent upon the authorization by Congress of MFN status as
specified in the Trade Agreement.'77 In 1972 then, the forecast certainly was
for increased trade and better relations between the two world giants.
B. Soviet-American Business Transactions-Practical Difficulties
At this point it would be profitable to digress slightly and discuss some of
the practical difficulties involved in concluding a commercial transaction with
the Soviets and some of the ways of getting around those difficulties.
Businessmen dealing with the Soviet Union encounter many problems not
met in the West. The basis of Soviet trade is a planned economy with a state
monopoly of foreign trade. The Ministry of Foreign Trade is responsible for
foreign trade operations. " 8 Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs) handle all
import-export arrangements for Soviet business and are the possessors of an
extraordinary amount of bargaining power because of their status as represent-
atives of the Soviet Government. An FTO is, however, an independent juridical
person, liable for its obligations. An FTO buys goods to be exported from a
Soviet manufacturing corporation and sells imported goods to Soviet corporate
buyers. Each FTO is confined to activities prescribed to it in the national 5-
year planning period. The economic plan is quite detailed. With respect to each
item to be imported or exported, the plan contains descriptions of quantity and
quality, estimates of payment for the total volume of each item to be received,
and estimates of payments to be received for exported items.78 Overseas, the
Foreign Ministry provides Soviet embassies with commercial attaches and
other technical personnel; the Ministry also maintains trade delegations which
issue import licenses, grant permits for transit of goods through Soviet terri-
tory, study local business conditions, promote sales for Russian export corpo-
I7' d. at 1323.
'7, Rohlik, Trading with Socialist Partners, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 362, 371 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Rohlik].
17' Starr, Framework, supra note 109, at 68.
' Lend Lease Agreement, supra note 161.
177 Id.
17 Winter, The Licensing of Know-how to the Soviet Union, I J. WORLD TRADE L. 162, 163
(1967).
17' Rohlik, supra note 174, at 363-65.
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rations, furnish local business with market information in the Soviet Union,
and act as agents for the FTOs.N A Western businessman must deal with the
representative of an FTO or a local trade delegation. He has access to the
Soviet market only if the state economic plan allows. As an importer, he has
a fair chance to buy goods from the FTOs. As an exporter, it is more difficult.
His goods must be included in the import plan and the FTO must be specifically
authorized to allow imports from the businessman's state or business domicile.
Without such prerequisites, and regardless of how much the FTO may like the
exporter's goods and commercial terms, he must wait at least until the next
planning period.' 8 '
In addition to the problems involved in dealing with a nonmarket country,
other practical barriers must be overcome. It often takes 5 weeks to obtain
visas to enter either country. Large portions of both Soviet and American
territory are off limits to citizens of the other land. Language difficulties,
difficulties in procuring the services of local attorneys, and problems with the
sluggish Soviet bureauracy are always present.8 2 Soviets tend to negotiate at
great lengths. An agreement that most Western businessmen could easily ex-
pect to reach in a few days or weeks at most, may take months to conclude
with the Russians. The Soviet aim is to haggle for price concessions and dis-
counts. Moreover, there is an intense distrust of Westerners in the USSR. 83
Soviets require translation into Russian of all data, including minor details like
parts lists. Reputable American translation services should be employed. The
Soviets do not allow mass media advertising. However, fact sheets (totally
devoid of political information) may be placed in product packages and deliv-
ered to consumers. All details of any trade agreement should be spelled out
unequivocally, including all contingencies. The Soviets do not honor agree-
ments "in principle." Joint ventures in the Soviet Union do not entail joint
ownership and risk participation. Rather, they call for industrial cooperation
by American companies in which the plant and enterprise become the property
of the Soviet government, and the credit extended by the American "partner"
is repaid by deliveries of products made in the plant.'84 Soviets like to negotiate
joint ventures as well as the licensing of American technology and the importa-
tion of whole factories and processes.' 8 Despite the difficulty involved, Soviet
counsel should be retained, and all investments should be insured with Ameri-
can insurance.' A foreign exporter is advised actively to seek contacts not only
with the FTO in question, but also with officials of the Ministry of Foreign
t Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 132, at 27.
"' Rohlik, supra note 174, at 368.
"n Osakwe, Legal Aspects of Soviet-American Trade: Problems and Prospects, 48 TUL. L. REV.
536, 551 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Osakwe].
" Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 132, at 31-33.
IS Osakwe, supra note 182, at 552-53.
" Comment, supra note 125, at 34.
' Osakwe, supra note 182, at 553.
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Trade and of the Communist Party.' 7 The Soviets have a strong penchant for
the use of arbitration."' Lastly, it should be mentioned that the Soviets have a
very good record of honoring contractual obligations.'
C. Soviet-American Trade, 1972-1974
The prospect for increased trade was fulfilled in the years 1972-1974."'0
Soviet-American trade jumped from $219.2 million in 1971 to $642.3 million
in 1972, and to $1.40 billion in 1973."'1 Trade figures are expected to be lower
in 1974, in the $1.17 billion to $1.3 billion range,"2 because of the windup of
the wheat deal.1 3 Before passage of the Trade Act, the U.S.-Soviet Trade and
Economic Council painted the picture of $3 billion trade per year between the
two lands in the year 1980.1"4 The United States has shown a trade surplus with
the Soviet Union so far this decade, ranging from $46.4 million in 1970 to
$451.3 million in 1972, and to $976.4 million in 1973,"5 despite total United
States trade deficits of $11.4 billion in 1972 and $3.8 billion in 1973.'96 The
1974 United States trade surplus with the Soviet Union is expected to be be-
tween $500 million and $630 million."97
The major reason for the increase in United States exports to Russia during
this period has been the availability of credits to the Soviet Union from the
Eximbank,"'I the primary source of credit for all American foreign trade. 9' The
President has been given the power to authorize Eximbank loans to the Soviet
Union upon a determination that such would not compromise national secu-
rity.2w The bank has four basic export programs: (1) direct credit to borrowers
outside the United States; (2) export credit guarantees; (3) export credit insur-
ance; and (4) discount loans.29 ' Since 1973, the Eximbank has financed
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Soviet purchases in the United
" Rohlik, supra note 174, at 368.
' Starr, Framework, supra note 109, at 76-78.
"' Pisar, Coexistence and Commerce with Russia and China: Ground Rules for East-West
Trade, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH SINO-SOVIET NATIONS 3 (J. Haight
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Coexistence and Commerce: Ground Rules]. For a complete analysis
of Soviet foreign trade see G. SMITH, SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE: ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS AND
POLICY, 1918-1971 (1973).
"' For a comprehensive look at Soviet-American trade during this period see Fitzpatrick,
Soviet-American Trade, 1972-1974: A Summary, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 39 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Fitzpatrick].
..' 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, Table, at 682.
I" Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, Table, at 42.
"7 N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, at 4, col. I.
1 Id., Oct. 17, 1974, at 59, col. 7.
" 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, Table, at 682.
,I Id. Table, at 661. These figures are on a c.i.f. basis.
"7 Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, Table, at 42.
I" Id. at 40-41.
" Comment, supra note 125, at 25.
2w 12 U.S.C. § 635 (Supp. 111, 1973), amending 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1970).
" Starr, Trading, supra note 112, at 1305.
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States. 0 1 Many of the United States-Soviet deals have received much publicity,
especially the grain deal and several American contracts, which include the
Kama River Truck Project 2' 3 and Dr. Armand Hammer's Occidental Petro-
leum Company's arrangements involving nickel-metal-finishing equipment,211
a fertilizer-chemical complex,20 the International Trade Center, and natural
gas.207 These arrangements have usually involved barter and/or joint financing
by the Eximbank and commercial banks. 20 The export of high level technology
has proved difficult. Export licenses have been delayed indefinitely on IBM's
proposed sale of its 370 computer system, Boeing's proposed sale of jumbo jet
frames, and other proposed sales of numerically controlled multiple-access
tools which can be programmed to make military items as easily as civilian
items.2" However, all in all, the years 1972-1974 represented a significant leap
in the volume of United States-Soviet trade.
D. Darkening Skies-Congressional Qualifications to Expanded Trade
Statutory authority was needed to carry out the Trade Agreement. Immedi-
ately upon presenting the bill to Congress, the President met stiff opposition.
Resentment was expressed that the Russian lend-lease debt was scaled down
from $11 billion to $722 million conditionally and only $48 million uncondition-
ally.' Such a settlement made some Senators very apprehensive about entering
into any more arrangements with the Soviet Union, despite the fact that the
lend-lease settlement was typical of other lend-lease settlements and favorable
in comparison with the English settlement.2 ' Some Congressmen opposed ex-
porting advanced technology which could be used for military purposes,21 2
despite the existence and enforcement of export controls on high level technol-
ogy' and Secretary Kissinger's assurances that the Soviet Union would con-
tinue to develop militarily even with a total boycott, and despite his argument
that economic ties, not boycotts, would bring about a moderation in the arms
race. 214 Opponents contended further that America should not assist in the
" N.Y. Times, May 22, 1974, at I, col. 5; id., March 23, 1974, at 39, col. 7; id., Jan. 19, 1974,
at 45, col. 4; id., March 22, 1973, at 3, col. 1.
" Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 45-48.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1972, at 73, col. 1.
Id., April 13, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
Id., Sept. 19, 1973, at 65, col. 1.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 50-51. Fitzpatrick's article discusses each of these arrange-
ments and many more contracts, agreements, etc., in detail.
m E.g., the $36 million Eximbank and $36 million Chase Manhattan Bank arrangements, plus
$8 million cash (supplied by the Soviets) for the $80 million of American goods and services are to
go into the International Trade Center in Moscow. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1974, at 39, col. 2.
' Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 59-60.
211 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. I, at 244.
M Id. at 245.
212 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1974, § 3, at I, col. 1.
213 See note 209 supra and accompanying text.
21 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 485.
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economic development of a country whose political system was antagonistic to
the United States.2 15 Rather than invest in Soviet resources, opponents argued
that the prudent path to follow would be to allocate comparable funds to the
development of American self-sufficiency in energy.2"'
The strongest, most vociferous, and emotional objections came from a broad
coalition of Senators and Congressmen, led by Senator Henry Jackson, that
opposed granting MFN treatment to a land which denied basic human rights.
Specifically, they felt that the Soviet Union should not be rewarded with favor-
able trade status while denying its citizens the right to emigrate. Cosponsored
by majorities in the Senate and House, an amendment (the "Jackson" or
"Jackson-Vanik" amendment) was added to the Administration's bill. 17 This
amendment prohibited the granting of MFN treatment, credits, credit guaran-
tees, or investment guarantees to any nonmarket economy that denied its
citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate or to any country which imposed
more than nominal restrictions on emigration.2 11 In the Soviet Union, travel is
officially regarded as a privilege, not a right, and few Soviet citizens are able
to obtain permission to leave the country. This policy prevails even if they are
only requesting permission for a vacation."' 9 Despite this policy, Soviet authori-
ties assured President Nixon in March 1973 that a significant increase in
emigration would be continued indefinitely and that the "education tax" would
be waived. n2 Secretary Brezhnev personally gave American Senators the same
assurance.2' As promised, the Soviets shelved the education tax by September
19 7 3 .m They also announced ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which affirms that "everyone shall be free to leave
any country, including his own;"'  and they allowed Jewish emigration to
increase from 1,000 in 1968 to 13,000 in 1971, to 32,000 in 1972, and to 35,000
in 1973.224 Despite such signs of good faith, the Congress insisted on the amend-
ment, contending that quiet commitments were subject to different interpreta-
tions and could be more readily broken than formal commitments. Congress
also felt that the amendment would provide the United States Government with
bargaining leverage in reaching the goal of free emigration.22 5 With the passage
of time, it became clear that Congress would not back down. Shortly before
the bill was passed, and in the face of Soviet denials, Senator Jackson and
215 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
2 Id. col. 2.
27 The amendment is now the law, and can be seen in section 402 of the 1974 Trade Act. 19
U.S.C. § 2432 (1975).
218 Gibson, supra note II, at 561.
"I N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1973, at 12, col. 3.
2" 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 456.
"I N.Y. Times, April 24, 1973, at I, col. 5.
rm Id., Sept. 27, 1973, at 17, col. 1.
2m Id., Sept. 28, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
224 Id., Jan. 16, 1975, Table, at 18, col. 2.
Id., June 21, 1974, at 3, col. I.
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Secretary of State Kissinger made public an exchange of letters announcing an
agreement to grant the trade benefits in return for Soviet assurances of a level
of emigration of at least 60,000 per year.2 2 6 The Soviet Union never publicly
acknowledged such an assurance, and in fact protested against such an unwar-
ranted interference in its domestic affairs.12 1 Jewish emigration from the USSR
decreased in 1974 to 21,000.2n At the last minute, probably in response to the
fears of aiding Soviet economic and military development (mentioned above),
the Senate-House Conference imposed a $300 million limit on government-
backed credits or guarantees to the USSR. 9
E. The Trade Act of 1974: Title IV-Trade Relations with Countries Not
Currently Receiving Nondiscriminatory Treatment
Title IV deals specifically with American trade relations vis-i-vis nonmarket
countries. The President is to continue to deny nondiscriminatory treatment to
the products of nonmarket lands not already receiving such as of January 1,
1975 (that is, all but Yugoslavia and Poland).130 In order to "assure the contin-
ued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights," the Act
prohibits any nonmarket country from: (1) receiving MFN treatment; (2) par-
ticipating in any direct or indirect United States program of credit, credit
guarantees, or investment guarantees; or (3) concluding any commercial agree-
ment with the United States until the time the President determines that such
country no longer: (a) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
(b) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the documents
required for emigration; or (c) "imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine,
fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen
to emigrate to the country of his choice .... ,,211 If the President determines
that the requirements are met, MFN treatment, credits, and the like may be
extended after a detailed report to Congress 23 and approval pursuant to sec-
tion 407 of the Trade Act.
The previous subsections can be waived within the first 18 months following
the passage of the Act if the President reports to the Congress that: (1) he has
determined that such waiver will substantially promote the objective of free
emigration; and (2) he has received assurances that the emigration practices of
the country will lead substantially to the same goals3m There can be an
extension of the waiver after the termination of the 18-month period if the
President recommends such an extension and if the Congress approves concur-
rently the recommendation within at least 60 days after the end of the 18-month
2" Id., Oct. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
r" Id., Dec. 22, 1974, at 3, col. I.
I d., Jan. 16, 1975, Table, at 18, col. 2.
m Id., Jan. 16, 1975, at 1, col. I.
- 19 U.S.C. § 2431 (1975).
21 Id. § 2432(a).
2- Id. § 2432(b).
- Id. § 2432(c).
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period."' The President may terminate the waiver at any time.2 35 The House
or Senate may exclude any or all countries named by the President from the
waiver.21 If the House and Senate (within 45 days after the expiration of the
60 days) do not vote on the President's determination that the waiver should
be extended, then the waiver will continue for 12 months."7 Thus, the Congress
does leave room for the extension of MFN treatment by waiver without a
requirement that the Congressmen vote on the issue.
If the President determines that a nonmarket economy nation is not cooper-
ating with the United States in the accounting for, the repatriation of, or the
return of the remains of all Americans missing or killed in action in Southeast
Asia, then the United States may not grant MFN status, government-backed
loans and guarantees to, nor enter into commercial agreements with, that
country."8 The Act does not provide for a waiver in this situation.
The President may proclaim and enter into a bilateral commercial agreement
providing nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of countries if he deter-
mines that the purposes of the Trade Act and the national interest will be
promoted." 9 Such a bilateral agreement will be subject to a number of protec-
tions for property rights, national security, and the domestic economy 40 and
subject to the approval of Congress241
If there is a finding by the International Trade Commission that imports
from a Communist country have caused domestic market disruptions, then
import relief as provided in sections 201, 202, and 203 is available.2 2 "Market
disruption exists within a domestic industry whenever imports of an article, like
or directly competitive with an article produced by such domestic industry, are
increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause
of material injury, or threat thereof, to such domestic industry. 12 42
The Trade Act prohibits the grant of MFN status and government-backed
credits or guarantees to, and the entering into a commercial agreement with,
any land that places restrictions on the emigration of close relatives of Ameri-
can citizens.24' The Act does not provide for a waiver in this situation either,
unless a waiver under section 2432(c) is applicable.24 The International Trade
Commission is to establish and maintain a program to monitor imports of
articles from, and exports to, nonmarket economies, and is to publish a detailed
n Id. §§ 2432(c)-(d).
23 Id. § 2432(c)(3).
- Id. § 2432(d)(2).
Id. § 2432(d)(4).
2 Id. § 2433.
39 Id. § 2435(a).
240 Id. § 2435(b).
241 Id. § 2435(c).
42 Id. § 2436.
242 Id. § 2436(e)(2).
244 Id. § 2439.
2- Id. § 2439(d).
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summary of such data quarterly, including their effect on the United States
economy.'
An East-West Foreign Trade Board is to be established to monitor such
trade also. Any person who exports technology vital to the national interest of
the United States to a nonmarket land, and any United States agency which
provides credits, guarantees, or insurance to any such country, the sum of
which is in excess of $5 million in any calendar year, must file a report with
the Board."7
F. The Prospects of Soviet Compliance with Section 402
The economic importance of MFN status to the Soviet Union will be
discussed later. However, it is necessary to point out that MFN status is not
as economically important to the Soviet Union as it is to the United States,
because the bulk of Soviet exports consists of raw materials which generally
have a low duty or are duty-free, regardless of MFN status." The real import-
ance of MFN treatment to the USSR is its political significance 9 It is a
matter of "principle" to the Soviets,150 a "matter of national pride: indeed, the
Soviets, with some justification, consider our tariff discrimination against their
exports to be a violation of international law."' 25' To put the price, of MFN
status at the acceptance of intervention in domestic Soviet affairs was perhaps
asking too much of the Soviets. In such a situation, the Soviets would be
humiliated if they accepted MFN status. In light of the tremendous publicity
given to the supposed Soviet "assurances" of increased emigration, 2 2 and the
added limitation on government-backed credit in the Act,2 s it is not surprising
that the Soviet Union and the United States decided to nullify the Trade
Agreement of 1972 in early 1975.'31 Secretary of State Kissinger announced on
January 15, 1975, that Moscow regarded the linkage of free emigration to
MFN status "as contravening both the 1972 agreement, which had called for
an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade restrictions, and the prin-
ciple of noninterference in domestic affairs. ' '2 11 The Soviet Union could "not
244 Id. § 2440.
247 Id. § 2441.
24 N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 18, col. 6. Manufactured goods account for only 15 to 20
percent of American imports from the Soviet Union. Id.
m Starr, Framework, supra note 109, at 69.
n' Rohlik, supra note 174, at 370.
25 Berman, supra note 144, at 520.
m The mass media gave widespread national coverage to all of these developments.
Secretary of State Kissinger described the $300 million limitation as "peanuts." N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1975, at I, col. 5.
' Id., Jan. 15, 1975, at I, col. I.
Id. It is true that none of the articles of the Trade Agreement explicitly condition the grant
of MFN status in article I on noninterference in domestic affairs. Article 9 holds that the Agree-
ment will enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance. The Soviet Union was
aware that such an exchange by the United States was dependent upon prior congressional
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accept [such] a relationship." ' 6 Soviet sources indicated that the Kremlin lead-
ership considered the $300 million ceiling as "insultingly 'small change.' ",257
Roy Medvedev, the dissident Soviet historian, charged that Senator Jackson's
efforts did help relax emigration rules at first, but his "ultimatum" eventually
led to Moscow's decision to reject the agreement.2 5 8 As many expected, the
Soviet Union announced in early February that it would suspend payment on
the lend-lease settlement (the "unconditional" $48 million is lacking one install-
ment) unless the United States granted it MFN treatment. 59 It is remotely
possible that in the future the Soviet Union will allow free emigration or assure
the President of such, allowing the provisions of section 402 to operate and
MFN status to be granted. However, under the present state of affairs, the
prospect of that occurring is remote.
G. Most-Favored-Nation Status
Were most-favored-nation status reciprocally granted, there would almost
certainly be a sudden increase in Soviet-American trade. Russian purchases
would increase upon the attainment of normal commercial relations,26 not
because of a resulting decrease in the price of American goods in the Soviet
Union (the nonmarket economy does not work on a true price system; i.e., the
price to be obtained will merely be that which is negotiated with the FTO, just
as before), but because of a greater Soviet psychological willingness to buy
from America as was seen in the aftermath of the Trade Agreement. The
economic benefits to Soviet exports would be mainly non-tariff ones, such as
financing, accreditation, business facilitation, the reduction of quotas, and so
forth. The Soviets would probably find themselves in a more competitive posi-
tion in the American market with regard to sales of cheap optical equipment,
canned fish, bicycles, or Zhisuli automobiles, the Soviet version of the Fiat.2'
The tariff on Soviet vodka and caviar would decrease significantly. A reduction
in the tariff would probably have only a modest overall effect on the level of
Soviet exports to America, because the large bulk of these exports will continue
to consist of raw materials and semimanufactured products, for which tariffs
are not now a significant obstacle because of their low rates. 62 MFN status
would benefit the United States not only through increased purchases by the
Soviet Union, but also through agreements on increased rights of commercial
representation, provisions for reciprocal credits, patent protection, increased
business facilities, and the resolution of outstanding financial claims and bond
approval. The USSR was thus, realistically, on notice that the Congress could put such a condition
on the Act.
254 Id.
211 Id., Jan. 17, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
2. Id., Jan. 24, 1975, at 5, col. I.
11 Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Feb. 2, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
20 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 387.
m N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1974, § 4, at 5, col. 3.
2 Starr, Framework, supra note 109, at 68-69.
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obligations.,63 However, any economic benefits to be received are linked very
closely to the mental attitude of the Soviets in purchasing, and that mental
attitude, as was previously demonstrated, is correspondingly closely linked to
Soviet national pride.
H. Section 613-Limitation on Credit to Russia-The Real Nemesis
The greatest irony of the situation is that even if MFN status were ex-
changed, there would probably not be a very large increase in trade between
the two countries because of the credit limitation placed by the Act in section
613 on government-backed credits, guarantees, and insurance. Section 613 of
the Trade Act stipulates:
After the date of the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, no agency of the
Government of the United States, other than the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion, shall approve any loans, guarantees, insurance, or any combination
thereof, in connection with exports to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in an aggregate amount in excess of $300,000,000 without prior congressional
approval as provided by law. 24
The devastating effect this clause will have on trade is self-evident. It would
now be advantageous to examine the reasons why each nation desires to trade
with the other, and how the denial of MFN treatment, and more importantly
the denial of credit, will seriously hinder the attainment of these goals.2 5
I. Soviet Aims in U.S.-USSR Trade
The basic goal of Soviet economic policy in the past was the attainment
of national economic autarky. The Soviets rarely tended to trade abroad
merely for convenience or for obtaining marginal economies of supply. Rather,
they sought to obtain those goods in which their domestic economy was
productive. 6 However, when it became evident that Stalin's program of au-
tarky had ended a necessary stream of Western industrial products, and had
also closed off a possible market for the developing Soviet productive capacity,
the Soviet Union decided to improve commercial contacts with the major
industrial states,"6 7 while continuihg to avoid any reliance on other lands. To
accomplish these goals, the Soviets now desire first to overcome deficiencies
in their current operative state production plans through increased trade-with
3 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 387.
25 19 U.S.C. § 2487 (1975).
Heretofore we have looked principally at the legal framework, the quantitative amount of
goods being traded, and the practical and political problems of trading with the Soviet Union, with
only a few glimpses at the reasons each country desires increased trade with the other.
2U6 Note, The Limitations of the Damages Remedy in Enforcing U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreements:
Suggestions for a Revised Trade Technique, I U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv.. 199, 217 (1971).
3' Pubantz, Marxism-Leninism and Soviet-American Economic Relations Since Stalin, 37 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 535, 539 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Pubantz].
19751
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
all nations.0 8 Secondly, the Soviets desire to obtain Western technology," 9 of
which the United States is the leading producer. A massive campaign is under-
way in the Soviet Union to modernize economic management, automate the
planning system, and upgrade industry in order to stimulate lagging technologi-
cal growth."' As a result, Western capital and know-how are being openly
courted to help in modernization and to mine the untapped gas, oil, lumber,
copper, and nickel wealth of Siberia."' Despite the fact that computer technol-
ogy is often on the United States strategic goods list, the Soviets are most
anxious to purchase such American technology."2 The most important non-
technological item which the Russians desire to import is feed grain.2 13
One of the Soviet Union's own constraints has become the largest obstacle
to Soviet purchases of Western goods: the inconvertibility of the ruble and the
Soviet practice of limiting foreign exchange reserves. As a result, Soviet FTOs
are simply unable to make large-scale payments in dollars or other hard curren-
cies. n4 Thus, a third Soviet aim is to obtain foreign currency in order to finance
the acquisition of needed goods from abroad."5 The Russians must make as
many foreign sales of Soviet goods as possible in order to obtain convertible
foreign currency."9 More importantly, substantial credits are needed in order
to obtain foreign currency."' Billions of dollars of credits are needed to finance
the building of roads, pipelines, and facilities necessary to exploit Soviet re-
sources.211 Without large Eximbank loans, sales of American products and
services may easily be noncompetitive in the face of West European
government-backed financing."9 Other forms of financing are available, includ-
ing the payment of cash 210 and the creation of barter arrangements, often in
the form of a joint venture.2 1 Barter has been used by the Occidental Petroleum
Company in many of its Soviet transactions. Indeed, Soviet economic planners
see the possibilities as "immense" for large-scale arrangements, in which the
m Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 132, at 25.
269 Id.
270 N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1973, at 1, col. I.
2 Coexistence and Commerce: Ground Rules, supra note 189, at 2.
"2 N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, § 4, at 3, col. I.
V3 Id.
7' Nehemkis & Schollhammer, supra note 132, at 20.
I" d. at 25.
' Rohlik, supra note 174, at 365.
"7 Hoya, supra note 107, at 31.
27 N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, at 3, col. I.
' 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. I, at 317. This broaches a policy question often raised by
opponents of Soviet-American trade. Should the United States Government "subsidize" Soviet
purchases with low-interest Eximbank loans? Resentment to such a subsidization of the Soviet
economy was particularly acute in a related situation-the wheat agreement. The United States
Government paid $300 million in export subsidies to American grain firms while the American
consumer bore the cost of resulting wheat shortages. Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 44-45.
20 N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 18, col. 6.
201 See note 180 supra and accompanying text for a description of joint ventures.
[Vol. 5: 505
SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMERCE
United States would provide plant and equipment and the USSR would pro-
vide raw materials and the finished products of such plants." 2 However, few
American companies seem interested in such arrangements at present.
A last Soviet aim for increased trade is based on the current Soviet policy
of seeking peaceful coexistence with the United States. The Russians see coop-
erative economic relations as a strengthening and expansion of the process of
"d6tente."2s
In light of the Soviet desire for increased trade, it seems clear that the key
requirement for such an increase, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, is
the availability of credit. Section 613 clearly restricts that availability and may
very easily set back the chances for increased trade more than section 402.
J. American Aims in U.S.-USSR Trade
There are two major American aims in the development of Soviet-American
trade. The first is an economic one. "To the West, economically congested and
thirsting for new outlets, the communist world is a vast market .... ,,2s,
American economic growth would be stimulated with increased sales. 2" Jobs
for American workers would increase. 8 The United States could begin to pick
up a significant share of the East-West market, particularly since the needs of
the Soviet Union coincide with the products in which the United States enjoys
a competitive advantage, such as agricultural products and high-technology
manufactures." 7 Despite an increase in imports, the United States would prob-
ably continue to enjoy a highly favorable balance of trade with the Soviet
Union, which could function as an offset against the high costs of importing
oil.21s Improved trade relations are generally helpful to the solution of outstand-
ing economic and commercial issues, such as settlement of claims, or the
development of agricultural and trade information systems." 9 It is unlikely that
Soviet exports would threaten, rather than stimulate, United States production
and employment. Existing United States law (e.g., the Antidumping Act or the
market disruption provisions of the Trade Act) protects against severe injury
due to imports and provides relief in the event of such injury.8 0 Some have
expressed fear that increased Soviet imports could lead to undue dependence
on Soviet raw materials."' Such dependence is less likely to occur today than
22 N.Y. Times, May 30, 1972, at 19, col. 5.
20 Pubantz, supra note 267, at 544.
2 Coexistence and Commerce. Ground Rules, supra note 189, at 2.
z' 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. I, at 317.
Bilder, supra note 101, at 850.
20 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. I, at 317.
25 Id.
i' Id.
25 Starr, Framework, supra note 109, at 71; see 1974 Trade Act, title II, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-
394 (1975).
25 Hoya, supra note 107, at 35. For a recounting of American objections to increased trade,
see notes 207-25 supra and accompanying text.
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in the past, because of the present American awareness of the danger of exces-
sive reliance on foreign sources for commodities.
The second major aim of the United States in increasing trade with the
USSR is a political one, that of obtaining peaceful coexistence. 92 The United
States hopes to encourage the Soviet Union to maintain a moderate course in
foreign policy and to create linkages between the two lands that might put a
"brake on a conflicting course" whenever a potential crisis arises. 93 Secretary
Kissinger noted in the Senate hearings on the Trade Act:
ITlo make bringing about democracy in the Soviet Union in the face of 300
years of Russian history followed by 50 years of Soviet history, a precondition
to making peace, would doom us to decades of struggle, and the outcome
would not be foreordained. We do not approve of the Soviet domestic struc-
ture. We do not like its values. We do recognize, however, that today, and for
the immediate future, we are doomed to coexistence with the Soviet Union. 24
Trade and enmity do not go hand in hand as often as do trade and amity. Thus,
it was hoped that better commercial relations would be a force weighing against
the outbreak of hostilities.
The denial of MFN status advances neither of these two aims. The limitation
on credit even more surely limits the possibility of large-scale sales by the
United States to the Soviet Union and the resulting economic stimulation and
support for peaceful coexistence.
K. Availability of Other Markets to the Soviet Union
With the exception of highly developed computer technology, which is avail-
able only from the United States, the Soviet Union has access to other sources
for almost all of the technological goods it desires.99 This technology may not
be exportable under present export restrictions .2  Credit, of course, can be
obtained elsewhere if the Eximbank is no longer able to finance Soviet pur-
chases. 29 7 In 1958, shortly after President Eisenhower rejected a trade agree-
ment with the Soviet Union, the British government accepted a very similar
proposal with the Soviets.2 99 After receiving no positive response from the
United States on another similar trade proposal in 1964, the Soviet Union
negotiated a very elaborate set of intergovernmental trade arrangements with
the French. 99 West European and Japanese Governments frequently partici-
pate in the extension of credit to the Soviet Union for periods as long as 15
years. 99 A Soviet-French trade pact signed in December 1974 included $2.5
211 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 486.
23 Id.
I, d. at 491.
n Id. at 388.
21 Fitzpatrick, supra note 190, at 58-60.
n 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 465.
21 Berman, supra note 144, at 519.
21 Id.
20Nehemkis & Scholihammer, supra note 132, at 18.
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billion of French credit to finance $3.5 billion worth of Soviet orders over the
next 5 years." Therefore, the Soviets are not coming to the United States
as a last resort. If they cannot obtain adequate, competitive financing here,
credits and most goods are available elsewhere.
L. The Result
In the unlikely event that MFN treatment is exchanged in the near future,
trade will probably increase to the modest degree that lower tariffs and fewer
non-tariff restrictions will allow. But until the $300 million credit limit is re-
moved, no significant expansion can be expected. With the situation as it is
(that no Eximbank loans will be made to the Soviets until a "satisfactory" level
of emigration is reached), trade can and will continue. Commercial banks can
still arrange credit dealings. However, private banks have generally preferred
Eximbank co-participation in the financing of exports to the Soviet Union."'2
Without such government-backed financial support, it is doubtful that there
will be any increase in private financing, and if anything, it is possible that there
will be a decrease. Cash deals, barter, and joint ventures can and will continue,
but most of such arrangements have been made in conjunction with some sort
of financing. Since this financing has very often been Eximbank financing, such
arrangements are less likely in the future. American businessmen in the Soviet
Union plan on staying there and seeking new business while working on exist-
ing contracts. Few expect to lose contracts already signed, but without a new
trade pact less offensive to Moscow, few American companies expect to receive
any significant increase in Soviet businessA" Because of the increased politi-
cal risk, American businessmen are likely to become more cautious in dealing
with the Russians. Small and regional American banks, without wide experi-
ence in international business, are expected to become highly reluctant to lend
funds to develop Soviet business.A" The Soviets are expected to become more
selective in dealing with American businesses if Eximbank loans are not avail-
able 3 5 For a rapid expansion of Soviet-American trade, government-backed
credits are essential. 3" American exporters simply cannot compete with ex-
porters from other countries whose governments offer such credits.3 7 The end
result is that the Soviets will buy goods from European or Japanese companies,
which are aggressively selling machinery and equipment to the Soviet
Union.3 11 Potential American jobs will go to those countries willing to finance
Soviet trade, 300 while other American jobs will be eliminated. t 0 And, most
°' N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1974, at 4, col. 6.
2 Id., Jan. 16, 1975, at 18, col. 6.
Id. col. 5.
M Id.
"' Id., Jan. 17, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
3 Id., Jan. 17, 1973, at 58, col. 4.
3 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 465.
3*1 Id. at 456.
30 Id. at 388.
32* N.Y. Times, March 22, 1974, at 55, col. 6.
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sadly of all, emigration from the Soviet Union will probably continue to de-
crease.
M. Implications for Dktente
Before the bill was signed, the Nixon Administration had insisted that pas-
sage of the bill with the Jackson amendment would be damaging to American
progress in establishing normal relations with Communist countries and would
seriously impede efforts to achieve more harmonious international relations.31'"
Secretary Kissinger himself stated that the "evolution toward a more moderate
international system [and] . . . the prospects of peace, would be severely
jeopardized ... . ,, After the dissolution of the Trade Agreement, Secretary
Kissinger sounded less pessimistic, indicating that there was no sign of harden-
ing Soviet-American relations across the board.3 1 1 Most American specialists
on the Soviet Union feel that the Kremlin intends to maintain relaxed relations
with Washington, but they do not rule out the possibility that Moscow will
stiffen its position on various fronts."' It remains to be seen whether or not
serious political problems will ensue as a result of the Trade Act. It is certain
though, as Secretary of State Kissinger had to admit, that "d6tente has been
set back." 15
V. CONCLUSION
The Trade Act of 1974 has provided the President with the authority needed
to negotiate further reductions in worldwide tariff and other import barriers.
The prospects for increased world trade have been enhanced. To that extent
the Act may be considered a success.
However, in the area of Soviet-American commercial relations, the outlook
is not optimistic. The New York Times editorialized that a number of lessons
were to be learned from the affair. Among those lessons were: (1) that there is
a very real linkage between d6tente and trade; (2) that the congressional role
in foreign policy is advice and consent, not taking negotiations into senatorial
hands or tying the hands of negotiators; and (3) that a superpower can not be
pushed around by a Senator, especially when the Senator insists on humiliating
public assurances from the superpower for 2 years." Perhaps the emigra-
tion figures and trade figures for 1975 will support the Times' point of view.
From this author's point of view, title IV and section 613 of the Act are indeed
most unfortunate and present serious impediments to the future of Soviet-
American commercial relations. The efforts of the Congress to force the Soviet
Union into concessions has had an effect diametrically opposed to the intended
" 1974 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 321.
3 Id. pt. 2, at 475.
313 Id.
"' Id., Jan. 17, 1975, at 2, col. 1.
3S Id.
311 Id. at 32, col. I.
[Vol. 5: 505
19751 SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMERCE 539
result. Had the amendments not been made, the result probably would have
been a higher level of American employment and business, a much freer flow
of emigration from the Soviet Union, and another small step toward peaceful
coexistence.
Kenneth Klein
